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Shame as a Resonant Emotion. The Case of 
Autism Spectrum Disorder 
Vergonha como uma emoção ressonante. O caso do 






In this paper, drawing on phenomenological and clinical literature, we will describe 
shame as a resonant emotion where the subjects involved are intertwined with one 
another thanks to two pre-reflective features of selfhood: embodiment and common 
sense. Furthermore, we will pay particular attention to the notion of intercorporeality, as 
it reflects the fact that our self, since birth, is essentially relational and embodied. In 
doing so, we will use the case of autism spectrum disorder as a paradigmatic situation 
and we will claim that the difficulties experienced by autistic subjects in feeling shame 
(and other complex emotions) are primarily due to the lack or the impairments in the 
domains of intercorporeality and common sense. In this view, shame reveals its complex 
nature and it is synonymous with a bodily and essentially relational emotion. 
Keywords: Shame. Autism. Embodiment. Intercorporeality. Interaffectivity. 
Resumo 
Neste artigo descreveremos, tomando como base a literatura fenomenológica e clínica, 
o fenómeno da vergonha como uma emoção ressonante na qual os sujeitos se 
encontram interrelacionados entre si, graças a dois aspectos pré-reflexivos do 
sentimento de ”si mesmo’’: corporeidade e senso comum. Mais especificamente, 
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daremos atenção à noção de intercorporeidade, tal como esta reflete o fato de o nosso 
self, desde o nascimento, ser essencialmente relacional e corporificado. Ao fazê-lo, nos 
utilizaremos do transtorno de espectro autista como exemplo paradigmático e 
argumentaremos que as dificuldades experienciadas por sujeitos autistas relacionadas à 
vergonha ocorrem, principalmente, por causa da falta ou de disfunções nos domínios da 
intercorporeidade e do senso comum. Segundo esta posição, a vergonha se revela como 
um fenômeno de natureza complexa e sinônimo de uma emoção essencialmente 
corporificada e relacional. 






Shame is a complex, multifaceted phenomenon. According to some accounts, 
shame is an emotion that typically focuses on the self, since the intentional object is 
the individual who feels it (Deonna, Rodogno, Teroni 2011), while, according to 
others, shame is a social emotion par excellence (Zahavi 2012, Montes Sánchez & 
Salice 2017). The aim of this paper is to provide an account of the phenomenology 
of shame by relying on the case of autism spectrum disorder in order to understand 
the nature of this emotion. 
More specifically, we will shed light on the link between embodiment and 
sociality in shame, arguing for a strong interdependence between them. Furthermore, 
it seems necessary to think of intersubjectivity as a multilayered experience, where 
primary, secondary and tertiary intersubjectivity are interdependent levels of 
interpersonal experience. To speak phenomenologically, the very broad capability to 
conceive of other perspectives (an ability which is at stake in perception) is strictly 
linked to the concrete experience of otherness, as well as to the development of 
common sense (the feeling of being part of a community or a group). 
In this view, an emotion like shame is not conceived in terms of representation 
or conceptual thinking (Lewis 2003), but seems to involve intuitive issues which are, 
on the contrary, the conditions for the development of concepts like Self and Other. 
In fact, according to studies in developmental psychology and psychopathology, 
social emotions do have a pre-theoretical structure, which arises prior to the 
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development of conceptual thinking. The analysis of autism is also useful in this case. 
Autistic subjects seem to barely experience shame, as they register a dissociation 
between their self-consciousness and the ability to be affected by the attitudes of 
another particular embodied person (Hobson 2012; Hobson, Chidambi, Lee & Meyer 
2006). 
The final aim is to show how shame could be read as a peculiar manifestation 
of the duality of human being, where the self and otherness are inevitably entangled. 
The analysis of autism spectrum disorder, a disorder whose core is precisely an 
intersubjective impairment, seems to be an interesting opportunity to shed light on 
the importance of sociality and of interpersonal, pre-theoretical engagement in the 
development of our emotional life. 
 
A Phenomenological Account of Shame 
 
Despite (and probably because of) the complexity and the ambiguous nature 
of shame, there is neither a rich body of philosophical nor clinical literature about it. 
Nonetheless, many authors have confronted this topic if only superficially, and the 
main theoretical knot linked to the phenomenology of shame is undoubtedly the 
problem of identifying its core. While many philosophers believe that shame is a self-
centered emotion (Scheler 1957; Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni 2011 1 ), others 
emphasize its strong intersubjective nature (Aristotle 2004; Zahavi 2012, Salice and 
Sanchèz 2016; Williams 1993). In this paper we will follow the second trend, and we 
will argue that shame is a resonant emotion: more specifically, under the adjective 
“resonant”, we mean to take into account two specific characterizations, namely 
intercorporeality and common sense. 
While common sense is referred to the pre-reflective, innate, “tuning in” with 
otherness, which enables us to be engaged in a social context; intercorporeality 
                                            
1It is important to specify that Scheler’s account differs from Deonna, Théroni and Rodogno’s 
because, while they do admit that values can be socially acquired, Scheler claims that they are 
subjectively lived, that is, they are purely individual, to such an extent that shame can be defined 
as an individual essence (Emad 1972, 365). 
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involves the mutual bodily synchrony that allows two subjects to experience 
subjective and objective qualities through their lived bodies. 
The centrality of these features emerges in a social pathology like autism 
spectrum disorder, a case study which we will describe as representative of a loss of 
primarily intercorporeal and relational attunement, eroding the capacity to feel several 
emotions, including shame. 
Within the phenomenological tradition, Sartre, in particular, emphasized the 
fact that shame, because of its intentional character, reveals our relationality, our being-
for-others, since I am ashamed of myself before the other, postulating the other’s 
presence as the one who constitutes that which I am ashamed. The intertwining of 
the subjects involved seems to be the very reason of the arising of this emotion. In 
Sartre’s view, one’s public, exposed self does not exist before an encounter with 
others. The experience of shame has the effects of objectifying the self as something 
which can be evaluated and judged by others, a judgement that we can accept and 
acknowledge. As stated by the French phenomenologist (2003): “Shame is the feeling 
of an original fall, not because of the fact that I may have committed this or that 
particular fault but simply that I have ‘fallen’ into the world in the midst of things and 
that I need the mediation of the Other in order to be what I am” (312). More 
specifically, shame “is by nature recognition” in which “I recognize that I am as the 
Other sees me” (246). 
This relational, recognitional structure seems to be prior to any internalization 
of norms, as something which is constitutive of the self (cf. Montez-Sánchez 2015). 
Accordingly, it is possible to think about shame in terms of a multifaceted emotion, 
which reflects this relational, recognitional character of selfhood itself 2 . Here, 
embodiment (especially intercorporeality), and common sense play a key role, since 
                                            
2 In “Shame and Necessity” (1993), Bernard Williams explicitly speaks of an “internalized other,” 
asking himself whether this otherness should be anybody or need some further characterizations. 
According to him, the otherness at stake in shame is not a concrete one, but it is caused by the 
introjection of an external authority which we respect and  which represents “the focus of real 
social expectations, of how I shall live if I act in one way rather than another, of how my actions 
and reactions will alter my relations to the world about me” (Williams 1993, 84).This “other” is 
similar to Sartre’s: also in Sartre, the empirical, concrete presence of the Other is not necessary 
for the elicitation of shame, because the Other is simply another’s point of view which makes the 
self simultaneously the object and the subject of a reflection. Accordingly, this process favors the 
growth of a moral self, to such an extent that we can affirm that shame has a constructive power. 
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they are among those elements thanks to which the subject is a priori linked to 
otherness. 
As noted by Lindsay-Hartz: 
When ashamed, we view ourselves through the eyes of another, and we care about this other 
viewpoint. We believe that who we are is defined by an integration of our own view of ourselves 
with others’ views of us. Of course, we could avoid feelings of shame by giving up the value we 
place in social reality and retreating to an autistic world view that denies the input of information 
from any new perspective.” (Lindsay-Hartz 1989, 700, italics added for emphasis). 
This description is noteworthy for two main reasons: it is helpful in 
understanding the structure of shame; it uses the adjective “autistic” to refer to the 
absence of shame. How to justify this strong claim? 
If we take into account the structure of shame, we find that a similar emotion 
involves: a subject (x), an object (y), and a subject in front of x feels ashamed of y. 
The peculiarity of this schema lies in the fact that the object of shame corresponds to 
the same subject who experiences it3. Furthermore, unlike other emotions, shame 
presupposes another subject (a concrete or internalized other) whose gaze and 
judgement elicits our emotion, and this particular phenomenon. Given that autism is 
a relational impairment, it seems clear that the structure of shame is very complex and 
difficult to be elicited. 
In what follows, we will use the case of autism spectrum disorder to explain 
the importance of these features for an intersubjective development in general, and 
for the arising of shame in particular. In other words, we will claim that the difficulties 
in the domain of intercorporeality and common sense are closely linked to the 
difficulties that hinder autistic subjects to experience shame. 
 
A Phenomenological Analysis of  
Autism Spectrum Disorder 
Embodiment and Intercorporeality 
 
According to developmental psychology (e.g., Trevarthen 1979) and many 
phenomenologists (e.g., Gallagher 2008; Zahavi 2010), bodily expressions and 
                                            
3 We will notice that this is not a fixed rule: there can also be the case in which the subject x feel 
ashamed because of another subject y. Nonetheless, in this case x feel ashamed of y because 
s/he considers y a member of her/his same group (see Montes-Sánchez and Salice 2017). 
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gestures are fundamental in the development of the understanding of otherness. This 
seems to be explicit since childhood, when a baby develops the ability to distinguish 
between the self and others, the proprioceptive sense of their own body (Tsakiris 
2017), as well as the ability to discern between animate and inanimate beings (Kaduk, 
Elsner, and Reid 2013). Already at this stage, the other is perceived as an intentional 
agent who uses its own expressive language: in other words, we do not infer another’s 
mental states, nor we deliberately simulate them, but we intuitively grasp them 
through another’s bodily gestures and bodily expressions. In the intersubjective 
encounter, the other is not a mere object but a Leib (a living body). 
The fact that we do not need theoretical abilities to understand the other is 
confirmed by several studies from developmental psychology, according to which 
toddlers are able to interact with others and conceive of them as other subjects before 
developing a theory of mind (the ability to read other’s mind, which usually develops 
at the age of 4) thanks to an embodied form of understanding. This is called “primary 
intersubjectivity” (Threvarthen 1979) and can be described as an implicit attunement 
with others and their emotions. As Daniel Stern (1985) describes in The Interpersonal 
World of the Infant, «we appear to be dealing with behavior as expression rather than as 
sign or symbol» (142). This capacity is innate and allows the infant to interpret—
perceptively, not theoretically—the body movements of the other. 
As argued by Scheler (2005), our initial perception of otherness is not rational. 
Nonetheless, there is a wide debate concerning the core of this. Rather, it implies the 
cognition of bodily expressions and sensory-motor capacities: in fact, the infant is 
able to perceive the meaning of expressions thanks to a universal grammar of 
expressivity provided by the Leibschema—a dynamic, implicit structure which is prior 
to, and is also a condition of, internal and external perception. Thanks to our 
Leibschema, we find ourselves as being innately engaged and attuned with the others 
and the world. Integrating the Schelerian theory with observations furnished by 
developmental psychology (Maiese 2013; Trevarthen 1979, 2005), we could very well 
argue that bodily and motor elements allow the subject to establish an initial 
connection with otherness. In this context, corporeality plays a fundamental role: not 
only do we see the rage (or the shame) in expressions and movements of others, but 
it is as if we personally feel this emotion with our own body. Therefore, our being 
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embodied seems to be the necessary condition for the arising of an empathic 
attunement with the other. 
This basic level of engagement with the other is called “primary intersubjectivity” 
(Threvarthen 1979) and can also be defined as a synchronic, affective resonance that 
does not entail cognitive abilities (like recognition or group identification). In this 
phase, the infant tunes in and responds to the expressive behavior of others, and s/he 
is involved in dyadic relationships (for instance, the relationship between the infant 
and the mother, the very first kind of intersubjectivity). 
The passage from this basic level to an extended, higher level of 
intersubjectivity, which involves the understanding of others’ perspectives, is gradual 
and—according to studies by Meltzoff and Moore (1977)—stabilizes around the age 
of four or five. As early as the age of one year, in fact, we can observe the transition 
from simple face-to-face meeting to what Baron-Cohen has described as, “a 
mechanism of joint attention” (Baron-Cohen 1995, 44-45). Given the mechanism of 
joint attention, the subject learns to understand the meaning of things, going from 
dyadic to triadic relations or intersubjective situations involving the use of objects (cf. 
Moll and Tomasello 2007). This “level” of intersubjectivity goes beyond the mere 
encounter with otherness, and it implies imaginative and inferential capacities. 
Hobson (2002) describes the passage from the first kind of intersubjective 
engagement to the second—from primary to secondary intersubjectivity—as follows: 
The defining feature of secondary intersubjectivity is that an object or event can become a focus 
between people. Objects and events can be communicated about. The infant’s interactions with 
another person begin to have reference to the things that surround them. (62) 
 
At the end of a complete and comprehensive description of the intersubjective 
process, neither a reduction in mental or abstract mechanisms, nor a mere focus on 
context, is possible: rather, primary and secondary intersubjectivity seem to be two 
phases of a single process which includes both sensory-motor experiences and 
contextual, pragmatic abilities. As noted by Fuchs (2015), we can also point out a 
tertiary intersubjectivity when infants begin to perceive others as intentional agents 
and they develop a self-other meta-perspective. Accordingly, we can claim that 
intersubjectivity is a multilayered mechanism which requires an integrated account 
consisting of several perspectives. 
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The role of embodiment for the arising of all the levels of intersubjectivity is 
so important that it is possible to define intersubjectivity as intercorporeality: in fact, the 
body-as-subject (Leib) is the medium of every kind of experience. According to Fuchs 
and Schlimme (2009): 
[I]t operates in every action and interaction with others, without requiring explicit attention. It 
encompasses those abilities and dispositions that are neither representations nor rules but are 
actualized in our everyday life in a tacit or implicit mode, before we can reflect upon our experience. 
(571). 
 
Being a lived body allows not only for self-consciousness, but also for the 
experience of alterity. Firstly, being embodied is essential: only through the Leib can 
I, in fact, enter into the field of perception of the other, who, in turn, recognizes me 
as Leibanalogon (a corporeality which finds its expression in an individuality) (cf. Bizzari 
2017, 8). Because others are implied in my perceptual horizon before a concrete face-
to-face encounter, perception is never exhausted in the short term, but is an original 
reference structure for potential and anonymous co-perceivers. Thus, the implicit co-
perceiver is necessarily embodied since s/he is characterized by possibilities of 
perception. Furthermore, through the Leib, otherness is constituted as a new form of 
reality that is recognized as analogous to the perceiving subject, thanks to the 
similarities between the perceiver’s body and those of others. 
The bodily and multilayered structure of intercorporeality is evident in the first 
stage of autistic disorder, a syndrome that involves various symptoms, whose most 
prominent are: difficulties in social interactions; restricted, stereotyped behaviors or 
activities; and defects in language development and other communication skills. 
Speaking in phenomenological terms, this disturbance seems to affect not only 
the cognitive abilities of the subject, but also the so-called “praktognosia” (i.e., the 
capacity to relate to the world in a practical, such as social, sense, and not purely 
theoretically). The deficits of an autistic patient4 can often be identified starting at the 
level of primary intersubjectivity: one can observe disturbances in sensory-motor 
integration, gestalt perception, and imitative capacities. As a result, difficulties will 
arise with secondary intersubjectivity, which involves the development of higher 
                                            
4 Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is usually described as a pervasive neurodevelopmental 
disorder characterized by impairments in social communication and restricted, repetitive patterns 
of behavior, interests or activities (APA 2013). 
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cognitive abilities. Following a phenomenological perspective, autistic disorder also 
seems to be a disorder that affects the social skills of the subject as early as the 
development of primary intersubjectivity, by eroding a subject’s social inferential 
capacities. In other words, a disturbance at the pre-reflective, embodied level can 
cause disruptions in intersubjective, perceptual abilities, and cognitive capacities will 
be accordingly impaired5. 
In phenomenological terms, we can argue that impairments registered at each 
level of intersubjectivity (primary, secondary and tertiary intersubjectivity) are 
synonymous with a disruption of the bodily (and intersubjective) sense of self—in 
other words, of our lived body or “corporeal Self” (Fuchs, 2005, 2015; Fuchs and 
Schlimme 2009; Stanghellini 2006): a pre-reflective, bodily, and immediate awareness 
which is the ground for both our self-perception and our social attunement6. 
 
Is Shame Possible for Autistic People? 
Shame and Intercorporeality 
 
One of the main consequences of the phenomenological structure of shame 
(where the object is often the same subject who feels it) is the transformation of the 
self, that experiences its dual nature: it is a living body, capable of experiencing and 
perceiving, but also a corporealized, objective and materialized body, exposed to 
others’ gaze and judgement (in Sartreian terms, it becomes “corp pour autrui”, Sartre 
2003). As argued by Scheler: “because we’re more than our bodies, we can feel shame; 
but because we are bodies we must feel shame” (Dahlstrom 2017, 224). His famous 
example of the model who, in the course of posing in the nude, detects what she takes 
to be the painter’s lustful glance— a prompt that suddenly makes her aware simply 
                                            
5 See also Ciaunica 2014. 
6 Similar disruptions influence the process of participatory sense making (cfr. De Jaegher and Di 
Paolo 2007; Fuchs and De Jaegher 2009), which is defined as follows: “the coordination of 
intentional activity in interaction, whereby individual sense-making processes are affected and 
new domains of social sense- making can be generated that were not available to each individual 
on her own.” (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007, 497). 
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of her body—represents really well the duality of subjectivity, and the structural shift 
that shame is able to elicit. 
Shame is therefore able to transform the experience of ourselves as corporeal 
entities, decentralizing our perspective and emphasizing our being a subject-object. 
Through shame, we accept to become the object of other’s gaze7. As Sartre wrote: “I 
am this being. I do not for an instance think of denying it, my shame is a confession” 
(Sartre 2003, 285). 
The bodily resonance at stake in shame has a twofold character: it is self-
directed (or centripetal), since it involves bodily sensations able to elicit the subject’s 
reactions (if I feel shame, I usually blush); and it is other-directed (or centrifugal), 
because it is able to generate bodily action and tendencies directed towards the other 
and/or the external world (for instance, avoiding the gaze of others’) (see Fuchs and 
Koch 2014). In this view, an emotion like shame can be described as a resonant 
movement (“e-motion”) which involves two bodily subjectivities mutually influencing 
each other. 
So, it seems to be clearer why autistic subjects often register lacks in feeling 
emotions like shame. In fact, in autistic individuals we can observe a weak bodily 
sense of self, which is responsible for intersubjective impairments and hinders the 
development of complex emotions. There is a lack in relation to others’ bodily 
expressed attitudes, which could lead one to hypothesize that the intersubjective 
impairment at the core of autism spectrum disorder arises at the first level of 
intersubjectivity we described before—primary intersubjectivity—preventing the 
other levels as well, through a sort of “avalanche effect” whose result is a broader lack 
in intercorporeal communication. Hobson (Hobson et al. 2006), for instance, repeats 
several times that autistic subjects register problems in imitation, a capacity which is 
usually present from birth. In their interpersonal exchange, people with autism lack 
experiences of reciprocal or dyadically organized, emotionally coordinated states. 
Within the children’s own minds, they appear to have fragmented attitudes towards 
                                            
7Fuchs describes this process using an interesting definition:”the incorporate gaze of the other” 
(Fuchs 2003, 228). 
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the person-as-represented, or even a lack of those forms of attitudes, such as shame, 




Shame and Common Sense 
 
The propensity to respond with emotions to the attitudes of others—yielding 
experiences of intersubjective engagement—is foundational not only for experiencing 
people as people, but also for coming to understand the nature of persons with minds. 
In this view, shame is a pre-theoretical emotion: we do not need a theory of 
mind or specific cognitive abilities to feel it. On the contrary, social emotions like 
shame are the ground for the development of the concepts of Self, Other and so on. 
The “Other as Shamer Scale” (Goss, Gilbert, Allan 1994), a questionnaire which 
focuses on beliefs about how others evaluate the self and explore its correlations with 
other measures of shame, exactly shows the duality involved in shame, that is, the fact 
that it involves both self-consciousness and beliefs about how the self is judged by 
others, or, in other terms, a centripetal and a centrifugal component. The 
understanding of oneself as a shameful object involves both self-alienation and a link 
to the shared social world. In other words, what is at stake in shame are both selfhood 
and its essential common sense, the innate relationality which allows the subject to 
resonate with others. Children with autism are thus limited in the social-relational and 
emotional domains of self-awareness, and shame seems to be one of these domains, 
depending not upon the possession of a theory of mind or conceptual abilities, but 
upon the self-other pre-theoretical awareness and social attunement of the individual. 
Thus, the analysis of autism spectrum disorder sheds light on the necessity of an 
                                            
8This is in contrast to cognitive tendencies, like Lewis’ famous theory, according to which concepts 
of “self” and “other” are prior to the emotional experience: “In the case of jealousy, envy, 
empathy, embarrassment, shame, pride, and guilt” he affirms “ … the elicitation of this class of 
emotions involves elaborate cognitive processes, and these elaborate cognitive processes have, 
at their heart, the notion of self, agency, and conscious intentions” (Lewis, 2003, 286). 
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epistemological reversal between rational, cognitive abilities and experiential, 
interpersonal engagement, as well as emphasizing the social nature of selfhood. 
A scientific study confirms the hypothesis according to which autistic subjects 
experience difficulties in feeling shame: Hobson et. al. (2006) analyzed both primary 
and secondary, or social, emotions9 in children with and without autism. While there 
did not seem to be differences concerning primary emotions, people with autism 
showed huge impairments in feeling emotions like embarrassment and shame, as well 
as in being engaged with others. In fact, while the majority of children without autism 
show clear signs of shame, children with autism do not show any signs at all, or to a 
limited extent. Here is a clear example: “when he’s done something wrong, he’ll hide 
the fact and he says: ‘You are gonna shout at me, you’re gonna shout at me’ … he’s 
aware if he’s done something, and there is going to be a punishment linked to it. I 
think he’s more scared of the consequences than the actual doing the damage, that’s 
what I think” (Hobson et. al. 2006, 66). 
According to Hobson, the neurotypical and the autistic groups mainly differ 
in their relation to the organization of self-other experience, while the main lack in 
autistic subjects (expressed at the level of symptoms through impairments in bodily 
space perception, imitation and the use of personal pronouns) consists in a lack of 
intersubjective engagements (in particular, in the aforementioned domain of 
(inter)corporeality10 and we-intentionality11), which are needed for the development 





                                            
9 By primary emotions we mean those universal emotions in terms of facial expression and 
recognizability. They are usually reactions to external events. On the other hand, social or 
secondary emotions are more complex reactions, evoked from your perceived identity, past 
events, or primary emotions themselves (cfr. also Damasio 1999). 
10 Some first-person reports collected by Lindsay-Hartz (1989) describe the effects of shame in 
the following terms: “I felt small... I physically felt small and helpless” (694); and again “My body 
image went to pieces” (697). 
11 By we intentionality we mean the alignment of perspectives and sharing of intentions towards 
a common object or action goal (Searle 1995, Tuomela 2002, Bratman 2013). 
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Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we try to describe shame as a resonant emotion, that is, an 
emotion where the subjects involved are innately intertwined and influence one 
another thanks to two main features: intercorporeality and common sense. We used 
the case of shame to underline the importance of such features, that in similar 
disorders are missing or severely impaired, and we have shown that such deficits 
hinder the development of complex emotions like shame. What emerged is the fact 
that selfhood and intersubjectivity are deeply interrelated: my shame, in fact, needs 
both my self-consciousness and internalized external perspective on myself and on 
my ideas. In other words, shame elicited an intuitive alienation from my subjectivity, 
a movement between my own thoughts and a hypothesized (or concrete) otherness. 
This is why the autistic subjects do not experience shame: their intercorporeal, 
resonant self is impaired starting from the first levels of intersubjective abilities, 
causing disruption both in the perception of peripersonal space; in secondary, social 
emotions; and in the domain of common sense. So, we can affirm that the roots of 
shame are grounded in our interiority, but we need to take into account the fact that 
our interiority, our self, has an essential and implicit intercorporeal, affective, 
collective and resonant dimension. 
Accordingly, shame itself seems to have a relational nature, because in shame 
we experience an implicit (inter)subjectivity which comes before the gaze of the other 
and the encounter with others, and only afterwards. We have argued that shame arises 
out of disruptions in the intercorporeal and “we intentional” established realm of 
experience. However, we find it crucial to add one more element, here: relationality 
and the “intersubjective” self. As shown, selfhood and intersubjectivity are very much 
related, given that shame presents itself as a phenomenon that may arise out of one’s 
own perspective toward oneself and the situation out of which shame arises, but also, 
this same phenomenon may arise from the fact that “the other” is also important, 
given that we are constantly in relation with the world and others, consequently being 
affected by what others may say, how they may act according to certain social norms, 
etc. Therefore, autism is also a disorder with impairments in the inter-relational 
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dimensions, which is also thoroughly embodied, since we do not only communicate 
by means of language but also gestures and other forms of corporeal expression. 
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